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THE FOURTH YEAR OF FORGETTING: THE TROUBLING
EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN

DAWN CARLA NUNZIATO ∗

ABSTRACT
In its famous "right to be forgotten" decision, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in 2014 that search engine operators must, upon request from a data subject, remove links that result from searches for an individual’s name when those results are
“inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes… carried out by the operator of the search engine.” The initial implementation of the right to be forgotten was
limited in several ways. First, it was limited in geographical scope
to European domains of search engines. Google—the primary
search engine affected by the decision—limited delisting to its European domains (such as Google.es and Google.de) and refrained
from implementing such delisting within its global Google.com
search engine. While Google has consistently sought to limit the
geographical reach of the right to be forgotten decision, European
data regulators have insisted upon its global implementation. Second, the implementation of the right to be forgotten was limited to
search engines and only imposed delisting requirements on the
search engines; it did not extend to the underlying content at issue,
such as newspaper archives or other online content. As such, the
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very grateful to the participants of the Global Network Initiative’s Conference on
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Stuart Call, Alexia Khella, and Ken Rodriguez for providing excellent research
and library assistance in connection with this article, and to Dean Blake Morant
for financial support of my research.
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right to be forgotten decision mandated only indirect—not direct—
censorship of the content to be forgotten.
Recently, however, European courts have expanded the scope
of the right to be forgotten (and related privacy rights) to mandate
how newspapers and other Internet content providers make available content on the Internet, in some instances requiring erasure or
anonymization of such content. These expansions of the right to be
forgotten have posed greater impositions on freedom of expression, including on the rights of United States citizens and members
of the press to access information on the Internet regarding U.S.
court decisions. In addition, the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation—which went into effect in May 2018—
imposes even greater infringements on the right to freedom of expression and does not accord the fundamental due process rights
of notice or the opportunity to be heard to affected speakers and
publishers. Furthermore, the right to be forgotten is expanding
beyond Europe -- to countries such as India, Russia, Mexico, Japan,
and Colombia -- and these countries are imposing expansive obligations on search engines and Internet content providers to censor
information on the Internet.
While the right to be forgotten began as a right that was limited
in scope—and had a limited effect on the free flow of information
on the Internet—in the past four years it has rapidly expanded into
a formidable global threat to freedom of expression.
1. INTRODUCTION
It all began in 2009 when a Spanish lawyer named Mario
Costeja González did what many of us do and ran a search for
himself on Google. Upon conducting the search, he came upon a
newspaper article from 1998 in La Vanguardia, a popular Spanish
newspaper that maintained an electronic news archive. The newspaper article referenced the forced sale at auction of Costeja González’s property to pay for his social security debts. Costeja González
was not happy with these search results and claimed that the article and its ready accessibility via a Google search violated his privacy rights under the European Union’s Data Protection Directive.
Five years later, in May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union issued its decision in Costeja González’s favor in the
now-famous case of Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (“Google Spain”). In what has become known as the

“right to be forgotten” decision, the Court ruled that search engine
operators like Google must, upon request from a data subject, remove links that result from searches for an individual’s name
when those results are “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the purposes… carried out by the
operator of the search engine.” 1 In the years since the decision was
handed down, Google has received requests from European data
subjects to remove approximately two million links to web sites
containing information about themselves and has granted over
43% of these requests. 2
The initial implementation of the right to be forgotten in the
immediate aftermath of the Google Spain case was limited in several ways. First, it was limited in geographical scope to European
domains of search engines. Google—the primary search engine affected by the Google Spain decision—limited delisting to its European domains (such as Google.es and Google.de) and refrained
from implementing such delisting within its global Google.com
search. While Google has sought from the outset to limit the geographical scope of the decision, European data regulators have repeatedly insisted upon the expansion of the geographical reach of
the decision, to render the delisting mandate applicable globally to
all of Google’s domains. Second, the Google Spain decision’s remedy was limited to search engines and did not extend to the websites hosting the underlying content at issue, such as the newspaper archive that contained the article in the Google Spain case. In
the case of Mario Costeja González, for example, although Mr.
Costeja González requested that the Court order the newspaper to
take down or anonymize the article about him, the Court limited
its ruling to ordering that Google delist the article upon a search
for the data subject’s name. As such, the Google Spain decision
mandated only indirect—not direct—censorship of the content at
issue, since the underlying content remained unaffected. Recently,
however, European courts have expanded the scope of this and related privacy rights to mandate how newspapers and other content
1
2014 E.C.R. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and Mario Costeja González, 317, para. 94 [hereinafter Google
Spain],
available
at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62012CJ0131 [https://perma.cc/6X2F-6PCW].
2
European Privacy Requests for Search Removals, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY
REPORT
(last
updated
June
19,
2017),
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en
[https://perma.cc/ZR79-XUHZ] (noting that 900,665 out of a possible 2,080,903
links to websites were delisted).

providers make available the underlying content at issue on the Internet, in some instances requiring erasure or anonymization of the
content in the news archives at issue. These expansions of the right
to be forgotten have posed ever greater impositions on freedom of
expression, including on the rights of United States citizens and
members of the press to access information on the Internet regarding U.S. court decisions and proceedings involving European data
subjects. In addition, the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation—which goes into effect in May 2018—will lead to
even greater infringements on the right to freedom of expression
and will not accord the fundamental due process rights of notice or
the opportunity to be heard to affected speakers and publishers.
To make matters worse, the right to be forgotten is expanding beyond Europe, to countries such as India, Russia, Mexico, and Japan, and these countries are imposing increasing obligations on
search engines and the underlying websites at issue to remove information from the Internet. What began as a right that was limited in scope—and had a limited effect on the free flow of information on the Internet and United States citizens’ right to access
such information—has rapidly expanded in the years since the
Google Spain decision to a formidable global threat to freedom of
expression.
In Part I of this Article, I analyze the limited scope of the original right to be forgotten decision, emphasizing the ways in which
that decision was confined in its scope and geographical reach. In
Part II, I analyze a series of recent European privacy decisions that
have expanded the breadth of the right to be forgotten and the associated right to privacy in several European countries and have
disregarded the distinction the European Court of Justice drew between data controllers (who are subject to delisting obligations)
and media sites (which are protected from delisting obligations by
the right to freedom of expression and their journalistic privileges).
In Part III, I examine the ongoing litigation between Google and
the French Data Protection Authority over the geographical reach
of the right to be forgotten. While Google has insisted that the European right to be forgotten should be geographically limited in its
scope and implementation to searches involving and accessible by
European data subjects, the French Data Protection Authority has
insisted the European data protection laws extend extraterritorially, to all of Google’s domains, and that Google must implement the
delisting mandated by the European right to be forgotten on all
searches conducted by everyone around the world, including on
all searches on Google.com. In Part IV, I examine the recently

adopted General Data Protection Regulation—the successor to the
1995 EU Data Protection Directive—and the ways in which this
Regulation, which became effective in May 2018, further strengthens the ability of individuals to remove information about themselves from the Internet, to the detriment of Internet users’ free
speech and due process rights. Finally, in Part V, I canvass the expansion of the right to be forgotten beyond the European Union, to
countries such as India, Russia, Mexico, Colombia, and Japan. I
conclude by warning that, absent greater attention to these issues
and absent the contraction of this rapidly expanding right to be
forgotten, free speech on the Internet as we know it will continue
to be imperiled.
2. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE ORIGINAL RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
DECISION
The Google Spain case originated in 2009, when Spanish attorney Mario Costeja González became aware that a Google search of
his name returned links to a Spanish newspaper’s 1998 electronic
archives containing a notice about a real estate auction of his property connected with attachment proceedings for the recovery of his
social security debts. 3 Costeja González claimed that this search
result from a Google search of his name was in violation of his
rights under the EU Data Protection Directive, which requires that
personal data only be processed by “data controllers” insofar as the
data is adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purpose for which the data is collected and processed. 4 Costeja González initiated proceedings against the newspaper La Vanguardia
(in which the notice originally appeared) and against Google Spain
and Google Inc. before the Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (“Spanish Data Protection Agency”). Costeja González advanced two arguments in these proceedings. First, he sought relief
against the newspaper itself. Against the newspaper, he argued
that the notice should either be removed by the newspaper from its
electronic archive, altered so that his personal data no longer appeared in connection with the notice, 5 or that the newspaper
should employ technological means to direct search engines like
3 See Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 14 (stating that Mr. Costeja González
officially lodged his complaint on March 5, 2010).
4 Id. at para. 15.
5 Id.

Google to exclude the notice from its automatic indexing (by using
exclusion protocols or codes such as “noindex” or “noarchive”).
Second, he argued that Google Spain and Google Inc. should be required to remove links to the notice when a search was performed
on his name. 6
The Spanish Data Protection Agency rejected Costeja González’s complaint against the newspaper La Vanguardia, holding that
the publication of the notice was legally justified and indeed legally required by order of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs,
which mandated the publication of the auction notice so as to secure as many bidders as possible on the foreclosure of Costeja
González’s home. 7 Accordingly, the actual content regarding
Costeja González’s home foreclosure was not removed from the
newspaper’s website (and remains there to this day 8), and the
Agency did not require the newspaper’s website to implement
technological means to prohibit the article from being indexed by
search engines. But the Agency upheld the complaint against
Google Spain and Google Inc., and required these search engines to
stop linking to the La Vanguardia notice when Internet users conducted a search on Costeja González’s name. 9 Google Spain and
Google Inc. brought actions challenging the Agency’s decision before the Audiencia Nacional (“National High Court”) of Spain, and
that court stayed those proceedings and referred the relevant questions to the European Court of Justice. 10
On the questions referred regarding the application of the EU
Data Protection Directive, the ECJ reached several conclusions.
First, the Court concluded that the search engine operators’ activities fell within the scope of “processing personal data.” 11 Second, it
held that a search engine operator is a “data controller.” 12 Third, it
concluded that the Directive applied to search engines based outside of Europe like Google.com whose business operates and prof-

Id.
Id. at para. 16 (noting that the Spanish Data Protection Agency rejected the
complaint on July 30, 2010).
8
See Subhasta D’immobles [Auction of Properties], La Vanguardia, Jan. 19,
1998,
at
23,
available
at
http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/preview/1998/01/19/pagina23/33842001/pdf.html [https://perma.cc/2MKP-CUZE].
9 See Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 17.
10 Id. at para. 18.
11 Id. at para. 41.
12 Id.
6
7

its within Europe. 13 Fourth, and importantly for our purposes, the
Court drew a distinction between the processing of personal data
carried out by search engines and the processing carried out by the
publishers of websites like La Vanguardia. On this point, the Court
concluded that search engine processing constituted “processing of
personal data” by a “controller” within the meaning of the EU Data Protection Directive, but that the processing by the newspaper
website itself did not. Further, the Court noted that processing by
news websites fell within a separate category of processing “solely
for journalistic purposes,” which benefited from exemptions from
the requirements of the Directive. The Court explained:
[T]he processing of personal data carried out in the context
of the activity of a search engine can be distinguished from
and is additional to that carried out by publishers of websites, consisting in loading those data on an internet page . .
. [T]he activity of a search engine consisting in finding information published or placed on the internet by third parties, indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily and . .
. making it available to internet users . . . must be classified
as ‘processing of personal data’ . . . when that information
contains personal data and, second, the operator of the
search engine must be regarded as the ‘controller’ in respect
of that processing . . . .
[In contrast,] the processing by the publisher of a web page
consisting in the publication of information relating to an
individual may, in some circumstances, be carried out ‘solely for journalistic purposes’ and thus benefit, by virtue of Article 9 of Directive 95/46, from derogations [or exceptions]
from the requirements laid down by the Directive [including exemptions and protections for freedom of expression],
whereas that does not appear to be so in the case of the processing carried out by the operator of a search engine. It
cannot therefore be ruled out that in certain circumstances
the data subject is capable of exercising the [EU’s data protection] rights . . . against that operator but not against the publisher of the web page. 14
Thus, while the European Court of Justice in its Google Spain
decision imposed de-listing obligations on search engines under the
13
14

Id. at para. 60.
Id. at paras. 35, 85 (emphasis added).

Directive, it declined to impose any obligations on newspaper websites themselves in light of the protections that the Directive recognizes for journalistic purposes and for the protection of freedom of
expression.
On the basis of these provisions, the Court held that Google
Inc. and Google Spain—but not the newspaper website La Vanguardia—were bound by the Directive to process personal data of
European data subjects only insofar as the processing was “adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purpose for
which it is collected and/or further processed.” 15 Therefore, the
Court held, a data subject may require a search engine to remove
information that does not comply with these requirements. 16 The
Court concluded:
[I]f it is found, following a request by the data subject . . .
that the inclusion in the list of results displayed following a
search made on the basis of his name of the links to web
pages published lawfully by third parties and containing
true information relating to him personally is, at this point
in time, incompatible with . . . the Directive because that information appears, having regard to all the circumstances
of the case, to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or
excessive in relation to the purposes of the processing at issue
carried out by the operator of the search engine, the information and links concerned in the list of results must be erased. 17
The Court, however, qualified its ruling by observing that, in
certain cases, the public’s interest in accessing information about
an individual who has a role in public life may outweigh the data
subject’s interest in having the link removed. 18 It noted that “[i]f it
appeared, for particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life, that the interference with the [data subject’s] fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest
of the general public in having… access to the information in question,” then the data subject’s right to be forgotten request should
not be granted and the links should not be removed. 19 Accordingly, the Court established a balancing test pursuant to which the
search engine operator is required to weigh the data subject’s in15
16
17
18
19

Id. at para. 72.
Id. at para. 88.
Id. at para. 94 (emphasis added).
Id. at para. 97.
Id.

terests in removal against the interests of the general public in accessing information of genuine import to the public. 20 In applying
its balancing test, the Court concluded that the interests of the general public in accessing the information about Costeja González in
this case did not outweigh his interests in securing removal of this
information. The Court explained: “[S]ince in the case in point
there do not appear to be particular reasons substantiating a preponderant interest of the public in having, in the context of such a
search, access to that information . . . the data subject may . . . require those links to be removed from the list of results.” 21
On the issue of how exactly a search engine operator is to implement delisting requests from data subjects, the Court ruled that
European data subjects have the right to approach the search engine operator directly with their delisting claims under the Directive and that the search engines must then make a determination whether to grant or deny the delisting request. 22 For this
reason, the Court’s decision does not merely provide a right of action for data subjects to bring in courts of law or before their country’s Data Protection Authority; rather, it provides a right of action
for data subjects to bring directly to the search engines themselves.
Accordingly, the Court’s Google Spain decision essentially charges
search engines with the requirement of implementing a system for
evaluating and complying with such right to be forgotten requests.
As the Court explained, “the data subject may address such a request directly to the operator of the search engine (the controller),
which must then duly examine its merits [and determine whether
to grant or deny the request].” 23 The Court’s decision requires
search engines like Google to act as the decision maker to determine whether to grant or deny a data subject’s delisting request in
the first instance. 24
The original right to be forgotten decision, as I explain above,
was limited in several ways. Importantly, in reaching its decision,
the European Court of Justice refused to impose any obligations on
the underlying publisher of the information itself—La Vanguardia
Id. at para. 98.
Id.
22 Id. at para. 77.
23 Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 70/14, Judgment
in Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (May 13, 2014), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201405/cp140070en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AD8-MFHM].
24 Id.
20
21

newspaper—holding that the newspaper was protected by the EU
Data Protection Directive’s exemptions and protections for freedom of expression, as the newspaper was processing the data subject’s information “solely for journalistic purposes.” 25 Recent European court decisions, however, have refused to recognize the
Directive’s—or similar national laws’—exemptions for newspapers’ processing solely for journalistic purposes, and have imposed
de-indexing, anonymization, and outright erasure obligations on
newspapers and other internet publishers themselves. This trend
poses increasing dangers for freedom of speech and freedom of the
press online, as I examine below.

3. EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN TO IMPOSE ERASURE
AND ANONYMIZATION OBLIGATIONS ON NEWSPAPERS AND OTHER
MEDIA WEBSITES
Several European Courts have disregarded the exemption that
the European Court of Justice recognized for newspaper websites’
processing of data for journalistic and expressive purposes, and
have imposed de-indexing, anonymization, and even erasure obligations on the newspapers themselves. In a decision handed down
in October 2015, the Spanish Supreme Court (the court of last resort for non-constitutional matters) ruled that the right to be forgotten imposes obligations not just on search engines but on newspapers and publishers of the underlying content as well. 26 The
25 See Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 18 (“[T]he processing by the publisher of a web page consisting in the publication of information relating to an individual may, in some circumstances, be carried out ‘solely for journalistic purposes’ and thus benefit, by virtue of Article 9 of Directive 95/46, from derogations
from the requirements laid down by the directive [including exemptions and protections for freedom of expression] … It cannot therefore be ruled out that in certain circumstances the data subject is capable of exercising the rights referred to in
Article 12(b) and subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Article 14 of Directive
95/46 against that [search engine] operator but not against the publisher of the
web page.”)
26
See S.T.S., Oct. 15, 2015 (J.T.S. No. 545/2015) (Spain)
http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/contenidos.action?action=contentpdf&data
basematch=TS&reference=7494889&links=%222772%2F2013%22%20%22545%2F2015
%22&optimize=20151019&publicinterface=true [https://perma.cc/75CS-GKWY]
(concluding that the right to be forgotten imposes obligations on newspapers and
publishers in addition to search engines).

Court held that such newspapers are required to adopt technical
measures to exclude entire articles from being indexed by search
engines, and to render the articles completely hidden and inaccessible via general search engines—not just upon the search of an individual’s name (as was the effect of the Google Spain decision’s
mandate), but upon any search within any general search engine.
At issue in the Spanish Supreme Court case was the request by
two former drug traffickers to render inaccessible a news article
that the national newspaper El País had published in 1985 about
their conviction and imprisonment through any type of search on
general search engines like Google. 27 The data subjects claimed
that they had overcome their drug addictions, served their sentences, paid their debt to society, and returned to normal private
and professional lives; and that therefore El País should be required to implement technical measures to prevent the webpage
containing the article about them from being indexed by search
engines in any manner, not just as a result of a search by their
names (which is the relief that would be available to them against
Google under the implementation of the Google Spain decision).
The lower courts ruled in favor of the data subjects, and El País appealed to the Spanish Supreme Court.
In its argument to the Spanish Supreme Court, El País argued
that its initial publication of the news article about the data subjects’ conviction and sentence was legal, as was the continued processing and digitization of the article, and that its digital publication of the article was protected by the rights to freedom of
expression and information under the European Convention of
Human Rights. 28 El País contended further that it should not be
considered a “data controller” subject to the EU Data Privacy Directive’s obligations, as transposed by Spain’s implementing legislation. 29
The Spanish Supreme Court rejected El País’s arguments. The
27 See Brett Allan King, Spain High Court Issues First Right to Forget Ruling,
Bloomberg
Law:
Privacy
&
Data
Sec.,
Oct.
28,
2015,
(https://www.bna.com/spain-high-court-n57982062815/)
[https://perma.cc/Y8BY-P43J] (summarizing the case of former drug traffickers
who claimed their right to be forgotten against El País).
28 Hugh Tomlinson, Case Law, Spain: A and B v Ediciones El País, Newspaper Archive to Be Hidden From Internet Searches but No “Re-writing of History”,
Inforrm’s Blog, Nov. 19, 2015, https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2015/11/19/caselaw-spain-a-and-b-v-ediciones-el-pais-newspaper-archive-to-be-hidden-frominternet-searches-but-no-re-writing-of-history-hugh-tomlinson-qc/
[https://perma.cc/7DY4-RYJG].
29 Id.

Court held, first, that the obligations that the relevant law imposed
on data controllers extended not only to general search engines like
Google, but also to El País to the extent that it was an operator of a
news archives, because news archive operators had the technological ability to indicate to general search engines whether to exclude
certain articles from such search engine’s indexing, via the use of
robot.txt code or metatags such as “noindex” or “noarchive.” Second, the Court held that the continued processing by El País of
these data subjects’ personal data in its electronic news archive
containing the subject article was no longer lawful under Spain’s
law implementing the EU Data Protection Directive, 30 because the
data could no longer be said to be “adequate, relevant and not excessive.” 31 The Court reasoned that, while El País indeed enjoyed
the protections under Article 10 of the European Convention of
Human Rights, these protections extended primarily to the reporting of current affairs, not to the archiving of news. The Court explained that while the primary function of the press was to deliver
news about current affairs, it was only a secondary task of the
press to provide news archives to the public. Although the article
at issue contained true facts about judicial proceedings and criminal convictions that occurred in the 1980s, time had rendered the
further processing of the data by El País no longer “adequate, relevant, and not excessive.” While El País’s initial publication of the
article about the data subjects’ arrest and sentencing was justified,
over time the processing of this data lost its justification, according
to the Court. Thus, in balancing the newspaper’s limited interest in
maintaining a news archive containing this personal data against
the damage to privacy and honor of the data subjects and their
right to respect for their private lives, the latter interests outweighed the former. The Court held that, given that the data subjects were private figures and that there was no legitimate historic
or public interest in their identities, the ongoing processing of their
personal data was no longer justified. Accordingly, the Court ordered El País to implement technical measures to prevent the news
30 See id. (holding that the continued processing of the data subjects’ personal
data by the newspaper was illegal under Article 4 of Spain’s Ley Organica
15/1999 de Proteccion de Datos de Caracter Personal (the Organic Law on the
Protection of Personal Data), which transposed Article 6 of the EU Data Protection
Directive. Article 6 of the EU Data Protection Directive describes the data quality
requirements of scope of collection and use of data, adequacy and relevance of
data collected in relation to purpose of use, accuracy of data, use of data for no
longer than is necessary to accomplish the purposes for which it was collected).
31 Id.

article at issue from being indexed by search engines such as
Google and to render the content of the news article essentially inaccessible and invisible to the general public. 32
German courts have ruled in a manner similar to the Spanish
Supreme Court in the El País decision and have imposed obligations directly on the newspapers and publishers of Internet content
to use technological measures to render certain articles inaccessible
to the general public. The implications of one German court’s ruling are even more problematic for free speech than the Spanish
Supreme Court’s decision discussed above, as this court has imposed such obligations on newspapers with respect to news articles involving public figures. In a recent case, the Highest Regional
Court of Hamburg imposed obligations directly on a newspaper,
despite the newspaper’s argument that it was protected by the
journalistic privilege recognized by the European Court of Justice
under the European Union Data Privacy Directive. 33 The German
case involved the publication by a national German newspaper of
various articles in 2010 and 2011 describing criminal proceedings
against a well-known politician accused of being a pedophile. The
accused data subject argued, inter alia, that the newspaper should
be required to take measures to render the news articles about him
inaccessible. Despite the fact that the data subject was a wellknown politician and public figure, the appellate court granted the
plaintiff’s claim that the newspaper implement technological
measures to ensure that the subject articles could not be indexed by
general search engines like Google. The court rejected the argument that the newspaper enjoyed a journalistic privilege to make
the news article available and accessible in electronic form—
declining to recognize an important limitation of the European
32 Sebastian Schweda, “Right to be Forgotten” Also Applies to Online News Archive, Supreme Court Rules, 1 EUR. DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 301, 302-03 (2015) (explaining that although the Spanish Supreme Court ruled in favor of the data subjects, the Court overturned two of the lower courts’ rulings imposing obligations
on El País. First, the Court reversed the requirement that El País delete the names
of the plaintiffs in the article, and second, the Court reversed the requirement that
El País prevent indexing of the article within its own news archive search functionality).
33
Hanseatic Oberlandesgericht, Hamburg, 7 Zivilsenat [OLG, Hamburg]
[Higher Regional Court, Hamburg, 7th Civil Division] Jul. 7, 2015, 7 U 29/12
(Ger.)
available
at
http://www.rechtsprechunghamburg.de/jportal/portal/page/bsharprod.psml?doc.id=KORE217942015&st=ent&
doctyp=juris-r&showdoccase=1&paramfromHL=true#focuspoint
[https://perma.cc/W5NY-SETA].

Court of Justice’s Google Spain decision 34—and instead reasoned:
[I]f the operator of a search engine [like Google] may be
obliged . . . to block the accessibility of certain online information upon a simple name search, this has to apply all the
more to the originator of the information [the publisher or
newspaper], regardless of whether or not he or she enjoys
the press privilege. 35
As a result of these decisions by the Spanish Supreme Court
and the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg, news articles about
data subjects—including public figures like politicians—are no
longer accessible to the general public, whether via a search on the
names of the data subjects or via any other search on general
search engines like Google. The implementation of the right to be
forgotten by these courts goes well beyond the implementation
contemplated under the Google Spain decision, which only mandated that general search engines like Google modify search results
that appear upon the search of an individual’s name. As Jonathan
Zittrain explained regarding the limitations of the original Google
Spain decision:
[T]he idea is not to remove certain indexed Web pages . . .
from a search engine entirely, but only [to remove] that
which appears as a search result under [the data subjects’]
names. So, a document called “Jonathan Zittrain foreclosure
of 123 Main St.” might be (if I were an EU citizen) ripe for
removal as a result under “Jonathan Zittrain,” but not under “123 Main St. foreclosure.” 36
This limitation, however, no longer stands after the decisions of
these courts. Because the courts ordered entire news articles regarding the data subjects to be rendered invisible to search engines
like Google, the articles are no longer accessible by the general
public via any search on a general search engine. As a result, after
these decisions:
34 See text accompanying note 14 (discussing journalistic purposes exception
to delisting requirement under the right to be forgotten).
35
Sebastian Schweda, Germany, Hamburg Court of Appeal Obliges Press
Archive Operator to Prevent Name Search in Archived Articles, 1 EUR. DATA
PROT. L. REV. 299, 300 (2015).
36
Jonathan Zittrain, Is the EU Compelling Google to Become About Me?,
HARVARD BLOGS: THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT (May 13, 2014),
http://blogs.harvard.edu/futureoftheinternet/2014/05/13/is-the-eu-compellinggoogle-to-become-about-me/ [https://perma.cc/CN32-EPR9].

[S]earch engines [like Google] will be prevented from indexing the respective webpage or (in the case of the robots.txt file) the entire website altogether, not only limited
to the indexing by the names of the plaintiffs. This means
that the webpage cannot be found by any search engine . . .
effectively excluding the information contained in it from
being accessed by anybody via an Internet search, regardless of the search term used. 37
Courts in Belgium have gone even further than the courts in
Spain and Germany in construing the right to be forgotten to impose obligations on newspapers and other publishers. In the 2016
Belgian case of Olivier G v. Le Soir, 38 the Belgian Court of Cassation
(the court of last resort in Belgium) ordered a newspaper retroactively to anonymize the online version of an article it had published in 1994 concerning a fatal drunk driving accident caused by
medical doctor Olivier G. The 1994 Le Soir article accurately described the doctor’s role in the fatal accident, his conviction for
drunk driving, and the death of two people involved. In 2008, the
newspaper Le Soir made its news archives—including the 1994 article at issue—available and accessible online, such that a search for
the doctor’s name via a search engine or via the news archive’s
search function resulted in a link to the 1994 article. In 2010, the
doctor—whose conviction was subject to a rehabilitation decision
in 2006—requested that Le Soir anonymize the 1994 article to replace his name with the letter X. Upon the newspaper’s refusal to
anonymize the archived article, the doctor brought an action in the
Belgian courts claiming that his right to privacy under Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, 39 and his concomitant
Schweda, “Right to be Forgotten”, supra note 32 at 304.
Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], 29 April 2016, AR C150052F,
http://www.cass.be
(Belg.)
available
at
https://inforrm.files.wordpress.com/2016/07/ph-vog.pdf [https://perma.cc/326M-8AN2].
39 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entering into force Sept. 3,
1953, as amended by Protocol 11 (E.T.S. 155) which entered into force May 11,
1994) [hereinafter European Convention]. Article 8 provides:
37
38

“3. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
4. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

right to be forgotten, were violated by the newspaper’s refusal to
anonymize the article, and that these rights outweighed the newspaper’s rights under Article 10 of the European Convention to
freedom of expression. 40 The trial court sided with the doctor, as
did the intermediate appellate court, ordering the newspaper to
anonymize the subject article in its news archive.
On appeal to the Belgian Court of Cassation, the newspaper Le
Soir argued that its right to freedom of expression protected its initial publication, as well as its subsequent archive, of the news article at issue. The Belgian Court of Cassation disagreed, holding that
the right to be forgotten and associated privacy rights enshrined in
Article 8 of the Convention (as well as in Article 17 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights or ICCPR 41) provided a person who had been previously found guilty of a crime to
object to elements of his criminal past being disclosed to the public
and that this right justified limitations on the newspaper’s right to
freedom of expression. The Court held that, even though the 1994
article had been lawfully published by Le Soir at the time, its digital
archiving constituted a new disclosure of the doctor’s personal data that interfered with the doctor’s right to be forgotten and his
right of privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention and
Article 17 of the ICCPR. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
emphasized the fact that the doctor was a rehabilitated offender
rights and freedoms of others.”
40

European Convention, supra note 39, art. 10 provides:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. …
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions
or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”).
41
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (providing that

“1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on
his honor and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”.).

and a private figure, and that the accident had occurred over 20
years earlier. Balancing the newspaper’s freedom of expression
and right to create historically accurate archives against the doctor’s right to privacy and right to be forgotten, the Court held that
the doctor’s rights to privacy and to be forgotten outweighed a
strict respect for the newspaper’s right to freedom of expression.
In reaching its decision, the Court also recognized a troubling distinction between online and print journalism and held that freedom of expression and the journalistic privilege were more important in print than in online sources like Le Soir’s electronic news
archives. Accordingly, the Court held that the newspaper must
remove all references to the doctor from the article in its online archives.
As a result of the decision of the Belgian Court of Cassation, the
information about the doctor’s drunk driving accident, arrest, and
conviction are essentially erased from history by rendering the data subject anonymous, and such content can no longer be accessed
by members of the public. 42 The remedy ordered by this Court
goes beyond the remedy ordered by the German and Spanish
courts in the cases analyzed above, which left the underlying articles unmodified in the electronic news archives of the newspaper
publisher. Indeed, the Spanish Supreme Court expressly overturned the part of the lower court’s decision requiring that the
newspaper redact the names of the plaintiffs in the original article,
holding that a mandate that the newspaper edit or revise the underlying article was not an appropriate role for the court and
would be tantamount to revising history. 43 The German court similarly ruled that an order requiring that the newspaper retroactively edit its earlier articles was improper and rejected plaintiff’s request for this type of relief in that case. 44 In contrast, the Belgian
Court of Cassation failed to recognize the dangers of revising history and ordered the newspaper retroactively to anonymize the articles in question in its electronic news archives.
The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation has gone even further.
In an unprecedented recent decision, the Italian Supreme Court of
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43 See Schweda, “Right to be Forgotten”, supra note 32 at 302-03.
44 See Sebastian Schweda, Germany, Hamburg Court of Appeal Obliges Press
Archive Operator to Prevent Name Search in Archived Articles, 1 EUR. DATA
PROTECTION L. REV. 299, 300 (2015).
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Cassation has surpassed the obligations imposed on newspapers
by the Spanish, German, and Belgian courts analyzed above and
has ruled that a newspaper must delete in its entirety a truthful
and accurate news article that was only two and a half years old
and must pay damages to the complaining data subject for leaving
the article on its news archives for this period of time. 45 The Italian
case began when newspaper publisher PrimaDaNoi printed an article in 2006 that truthfully and accurately described criminal proceedings that were brought against a local restaurant owner, which
was undoubtedly a matter of public interest to the members of the
community in which the restaurant was located. Two years after
the publication of the article, the restaurant owner requested that
the newspaper remove the article (notwithstanding the fact that the
criminal proceedings against him were still ongoing), claiming that
the article tarnished his reputation and damaged the image of his
restaurant. When the newspaper refused to delete the article, the
restaurant owner brought suit in the Court of Chieti at Ortona.
That court held that, even though the article was only two years
old and the criminal proceedings against the restaurant owner
were still ongoing, the continued availability of the article in the
newspaper’s electronic archive was no longer justified by the
newspaper’s right to freedom of expression.
The newspaper appealed the lower court’s decision to the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, claiming that it enjoyed a journalistic privilege and right to freedom of expression to continue making the news article available in its electronic archives. The Italian
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the restaurant owner’s
right to privacy outweighed the right to freedom of expression and
journalistic privilege of the newspaper. In particular, the Italian
Supreme Court held that the public interest in the subject matter of
the article had been satisfied by the availability and public accessibility of the article for two years. That public interest had “expired” and became outweighed by the right of privacy of the restaurant owner after two years. The Court explained:
The time passed between the date [the article] was first
published and the date when its removal was requested
sufficed to satisfy the public interest as far as its right to be
informed was concerned, and… therefore, at least from the
date when the formal notice [to remove the article] was re45 Cass., sez. un., 24 giugno 2016, n. 13161, Giur. it. 2016, II, 1 (It.) available at
http://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2016/07/07/cronaca-e-diritto-alloblio [https://perma.cc/4ZUM-QRC9].

ceived, that data could no longer be disclosed [by the
newspaper in its electronic news archive]. 46
Accordingly, the Italian Supreme Court upheld the lower
court’s order mandating the complete erasure of the article from
the newspaper’s archive, holding that the news article had expired,
“just like milk, yogurt, or a pint of ice cream.” 47 In addition to
mandating the complete erasure of the news article from the newspaper’s digital archive, the Italian Supreme Court also upheld the
portion of the lower court’s order mandating that the newspaper
pay damages in the amount of 10,000 Euros to the restaurant owner and the restaurant itself as a penalty for having kept the article
accessible in its digital archives after the data subject had requested
removal and for longer than was necessary to serve the public interest. In essence, the Italian Supreme Court granted the data subject an entitlement to determine the length of time for which the
news article about him could remain accessible and the date after
which it no longer served the public interest for the article to remain accessible in the newspaper’s electronic archive.
The decisions of these Spanish, German, Belgian, and Italian
courts upset the balance that the European Court of Justice initially
carefully established between data subjects’ privacy rights and
newspapers’ right to freedom of expression and journalistic privileges. While the European Court of Justice expressly refused to
impose any de-indexing, anonymization, or erasure obligations on
the underlying news websites themselves, these European court
decisions have shown little to no solicitude for the journalistic privileges and free expression rights of newspapers, and have expanded the right to be forgotten and associated privacy rights in an unprecedented and troubling manner, to the detriment of the rights
of freedom of expression and access to information online.
4. GLOBAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EUROPEAN RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN
In the initial right to be forgotten decision, the European Court
46 See Athalie Matthews, How Italian Courts Used the Right to Be Forgotten to
Put an Expiry Date on News, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:12 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/sep/20/how-italian-courts-usedthe-right-to-be-forgotten-to-put-an-expiry-date-on-news [https://perma.cc/EJF76WXE].
47 Id.

of Justice in Google Spain did not directly address the question of
whether a data controller like Google must implement delisting
decisions globally (for all searches on Google.com, for example) or
merely within Europe (for searches on Google’s European domains, like Google.es). While maintaining that search engines
must provide “effective and complete protection” of data subjects’
right to privacy, 48 and recognizing that the European Union sought
to prescribe a broad territorial scope to its privacy protections, 49 the
Court did not speak directly to the question of whether search engines like Google must implement delisting only on their European
domains or on all of their domains. When Google initially delisted
the websites that Costeja Gonzalez requested that it delist, Google
only removed them from its European country-specific versions of
its search engine. The websites at issue, however, remained accessible on other versions of Google search, and, importantly, were
available when a search was performed on the data subject’s name
on Google.com. Google’s implementation of delisting only on its
European domains was unsatisfactory to European data privacy
regulators, which have demanded that Google implement the right
to be forgotten globally, not just within Europe, and a protracted
legal battle between Google and the European data privacy regulators—and in particular, the French data privacy regulator—has ensued.
Although the European Court of Justice itself was silent on the
issue of the geographical reach of the delisting mandate, European
data privacy regulators have insisted that Google (and other search
engines) implement the right to be forgotten globally, on all of
Google’s domains, including Google.com, and not just within its
European domains. First, in issuing guidelines within a few
months of the European Court of Justice’s right to be forgotten decision, the EU Article 29 Data Protection Working Party—
composed of all the Data Protection Authorities in the European
Union—determined that the EU Data Protection Directive’s priva48 See Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 38 ("[T]he operator of the search engine as the person determining the purposes and means of that activity must ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities, powers and capabilities, that the
activity meets the requirements of Directive 95/46 in order that the guarantees
laid down by the directive may have full effect and that effective and complete
protection of data subjects, in particular of their right to privacy, may actually be
achieved.").
49
See id. at para. 54 (“[I]t is clear… that the European Union legislature
sought to prevent individuals from being deprived of the protection guaranteed
by the directive and that protection from being circumvented, by prescribing a
particularly broad territorial scope.”).

cy protections must be implemented globally and not just on data
controllers’ EU domains. 50 In November 2014, the EU Article 29
Working Party adopted a framework for the implementation of the
original right to be forgotten decision—Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment
on “Google Spain and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González”— in which the
Working Party determined that in order to give full effect to the
data subject’s rights as defined in the European Court of Justice’s
ruling, de-listing decisions must be implemented in such a way as
to guarantee full protection of data subjects’ rights. The Working
Party determined:
[D]elisting decisions must be implemented in such a way
that they guarantee the effective and complete protection of
data subjects’ rights and that EU law cannot be circumvented . . . [L]imiting de-listing to EU domains on the grounds
that users tend to access search engines via their national
domains cannot be considered a sufficient mean to satisfactorily guarantee the rights of data subjects according to the
ruling. In practice, this means that . . . de-listing should also be
effective on all relevant domains, including .com. 51
Second, the French Data Protection Authority—The Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) (the National Commission on Data Processing and Liberty)—has waged a
protracted legal battle against Google in an attempt to require
Google to implement the right to be forgotten globally, across all of
Google’s domains, including Google.com. As France’s Data Protection Authority, CNIL is responsible for hearing matters in which
data subjects claim that data controllers like Google have not
properly protected their rights in making delisting and other data
privacy decisions. One such data subject, Dan Shefet, a lawyer in
Paris—who had prevailed in a defamation suit against another party—requested that Google remove links to websites that were alleged to be defamatory of him, not just on Google.fr and on
50 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party WP 225, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google
Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario
Costeja González” C-131/12, 2014, 9 [hereinafter Article 29 Data Prot. Working
Party
Guidelines],
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YZ4R-7A7Y].
51 See id. (emphasis added).

Google’s other European domains, but globally, on Google.com.
When Google refused to globally delist such sites, Shefet sought
and obtained a court order from the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance requiring that Google globally remove links to websites that
were deemed to be defamatory of him, and threatening
Google.com with a 1,000 Euro daily fine for noncompliance. 52
When Google still refused to comply, Shefet sought the assistance
of CNIL. CNIL had also received a number of complaints from
other French data subjects who were not granted the delisting that
they had requested from Google. Acting on Shefet’s and other
French data subjects’ behalf, CNIL wrote a letter on April 9, 2015,
to Google regarding what CNIL deemed to be Google’s failure to
fully implement its legal obligations under the European Court of
Justice’s Google Spain decision by not delisting the requested links
from all of its domains. 53
On April 24, Google responded that it would not change its
practice of delisting only within its European domains. 54 On May
21, CNIL informed Google that it had fifteen days to comply with
delisting across all of its domains. 55 The notice indicated that if
Google failed to comply with the order to delist globally within 15
days, CNIL’s President would nominate a Rapporteur to draft a
report recommending to the CNIL Select Committee that it impose
sanctions on Google. 56 On June 8, CNIL made public its Formal
Notice to Google of its obligations to delist across all domains. 57
On June 18, Google met with CNIL for clarification regarding what
was required in order for it to fully comply with the delisting order. 58 In July 2015, Google pushed back on the CNIL demand, and
requested that CNIL withdraw its Formal Notice. 59 After being
52
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https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/nov/13/google-french-arm-finesright-to-be-forgotten [https://perma.cc/ZH5G-ACLP].
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granted an extension for compliance, Google requested an appeal
of the order on July 30. 60 The appeal was rejected on September 15,
2015, and on September 25, 2016, CNIL initiated legal proceedings
against Google. 61
In March 2016, in an apparent attempt to compromise with
CNIL, Google began implementing a plan of extending its delisting
under the right to be forgotten beyond its EU-country level domains (like Google.fr), to all searches that appear to be conducted
by European Union citizens on Google.com. 62 Thus, under its extended implementation plan, if a French citizen conducted a search
on Google.com, and if the search results included websites for
which a French individual had requested delisting, Google would
remove those websites from its search results for that search, even
if the search were conducted on Google.com. As Google explained:
That means that if we detect you’re in France, and you
search for someone who had a link delisted under the right
to be forgotten, you won’t see that link anywhere on
Google Search—regardless of which domain you use. Anyone outside the EU will continue to see the link appear on
non-European domains in response to the same search query. 63
Not surprisingly, CNIL found this compromise measure to be
insufficient and incomplete. The Commission’s order on March 10,
2016, rejected Google’s compromise position. In its order, CNIL
explained:
Only delisting on all of the search engine's extensions, regardless of the extension used or the geographic origin of
the person performing the search, can effectively uphold
this right. The solution that consists in varying the respect
for people's rights on the basis of the geographic origin of
those viewing the search results does not give people effective, full protection of their right to be delisted. 64
CNIL provided further reasons in support of its conclusion that
Id.
Id.
62 Id.
63 Kent Walker, A Principle That Should Not Be Forgotten, GOOGLE BLOG (May
19, 2016), https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/a-principle-that-shouldnot-be-forgotten/[https://perma.cc/8ZCH-JCG3].
64 CNIL, supra note 53.
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Google’s compromise position was insufficient, noting that (1) personal or professional contacts living outside of Europe could still
access the delisted search result linking to content that may infringe the privacy of the person concerned; (2) personal or professional contacts living in Europe and using a non-European search
engine extension (".com") with a non-French IP address could still
access the delisted search result; and (3) the use of certain technical
solutions by one conducting a search could easily get around
Google's filtering system by allowing Internet users to change the
geographic origin of their IP address. CNIL emphasized that the
European Court of Justice’s decision mandated “the effective application of the fundamental rights of the individuals involved, i.e.
the right of privacy and protection of their personal data, with no
possible circumvention,” 65 and that Google did not adequately protect those rights by partial delisting on some geographic domains
and not others. Referencing the Google Spain decision, CNIL contended, “it is clear… that the European Union legislature sought to
prevent individuals from being deprived of the protection guaranteed by the Directive and [to prevent] protection from being circumvented, by prescribing a particularly broad territorial scope.” 66
In essence, CNIL interpreted the European Court of Justice’s reference to “broad territorial scope” as mandating worldwide delisting
by search engines like Google. 67 In addition, CNIL explained that
the Court’s requirement that “information in question no longer be
made available to the general public” required nothing short of
global delisting. While recognizing the potential conflict between
European data subjects' privacy rights and the rights of Internet
users throughout the world to access information on the Internet,
CNIL was particularly dismissive of the latter and maintained that
Google must implement delisting globally “without restriction,
even if it conflicts with foreign rights,” 68 like the rights of citizens of
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. (emphasis added). This is not the first time that France has sought to
impose its restrictions on Internet content globally, in a manner that conflicts with
U.S. citizens’ First Amendment rights. In the famous dispute between France and
another U.S. Internet company, France objected when Internet search engine Yahoo! hosted an auction site in which it allowed its subscribers to auction off Nazi
memorabilia. Under the French criminal law, it is illegal to “exhibit” in France
public uniforms, insignias and emblems that “recall those used” by (1) an organization declared illegal in application of Article 9 of the Nuremberg Statute, such
as the Nazi party, or by (2) a person found guilty of crimes against humanity.
CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] [PENAL CODE] art. R645-1 (Fr.), makes it illegal to “wear or ex65
66

other countries to access information on the Internet. CNIL further
maintained that the Google Spain decision requires global delisting
because once a company is considered a data processor within a
country, all data processing activities of that company that stem
from that country, regardless of where and in which domains they
occur, are subject to the European data protection law.69 CNIL imhibit” in public uniforms, insignias and emblems which “recall those used” by (1)
an organization declared illegal in application of Art. 9 of the Nuremberg Statute,
or by (2) a person found guilty of crimes against humanity as defined by Arts.
L211-1 to L212-3 or by the Law No 64-1326 of 1964-12-26. Two French groups devoted to combating racism and anti-Semitism sued Yahoo! in France, claiming
that Yahoo!’s hosting auctions of Nazi memorabilia violated French criminal law.
See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181
(2001), rev’d, 433 F.3d 1199 (2006). In its defense, Yahoo! claimed that, while it was
willing to abide by French law within France, and while it removed Nazi memorabilia from the French country-specific version of its site available at Yahoo.fr, it
did not have the technological means to restrict only French users from accessing
its auction site available at its internationally available site Yahoo.com. Id. at 1185.
Furthermore, Yahoo! argued, such Nazi-related content was protected under the
First Amendment, and therefore Yahoo! enjoyed the right to make such content
available to U.S. citizens via its servers for Yahoo.com, which were hosted in the
United States. Finally, and most importantly, Yahoo! asserted that France did not
have jurisdiction over Yahoo!, a United States company whose servers were based
in the United States. The French court disagreed with Yahoo!, and held that Yahoo! was in violation of French criminal law for hosting an auction of content that
was illegal within France. It rejected Yahoo!’s argument that there was no feasible
way for Yahoo! to restrict access to such content only within France and ordered
Yahoo! to take all appropriate measures to deter and prevent access to auctions of
Nazi memorabilia on its site by French residents within three months of the
court’s order or face a fine of 100,000 francs per day. While Yahoo! fought this order—for the next six years—in United States courts, along the way Yahoo! decided to cease hosting auctions of Nazi memorabilia within Yahoo.com. Accordingly, the practical effect of the French court’s actions was to impose France’s speech
restrictions beyond its borders, on a U.S. company, where the speech subject to
restriction was protected by the First Amendment, in violation of generallyaccepted foundational principles of international law regarding the limited geographical scope of a sovereign’s laws.
69
CNIL emphasized in its order that the European Court of Justice in its
Google Spain decision held that a company is subject to jurisdiction as a data processor within a country or territory “when the operator of a search engine sets up
in a Member State a branch or subsidiary which is intended to promote and sell
advertising space offered by that engine and which orientates its activity towards
the inhabitants of that Member State.” See Google Spain, supra note 1, at para. 20.
Since Google met these requirements and is therefore considered a data processor
within France, even though its processing may occur outside of France, CNIL contends that it is within its authority to require action by Google outside of France
for all of the “processing associated with the ‘Google Search’ service.” CNIL, supra note 53, at 7 (“[CNIL jurisdiction] therefore applies to all processing associated
with the ‘Google Search’ service, since, within the meaning of Article 5-1-1 of the
French Data Protection Act, Google France contributes, in French territory, to the
activity of the search engine operator based in the United States, as stated in
[Google Spain].”) Finally, CNIL maintains that Google’s differentiation between

posed a financial penalty of 100,000 Euros against Google, Inc., for
its continued failure to comply with CNIL’s order. In May 2016,
Google appealed CNIL’s order to the France’s Supreme Administrative Court (the Conseil d’État), which referred this question to
the European Court of Justice. 70
Google has sought to advance its legal position against the extraterritorial reach of the right to be forgotten in the court of public
opinion, in France and throughout the world, as well as before the
European Court of Justice. In explaining the broader legal principles at stake in the decision now pending before the Court, Google
has argued on its blog, and in an open letter in the popular French
magazine Le Monde, that a ruling in favor of CNIL would open the
floodgates to worldwide censorship of Google results based on a
single repressive country’s laws:
We comply with the laws of the countries in which we operate. But if French law applies globally, how long will it be
until other countries—perhaps less open and democratic—
start demanding that their laws regulating information
likewise have global reach? This order could lead to a global race to the bottom, harming access to information that is
perfectly lawful to view in one’s own country . . . We have
received demands from governments to remove content
globally on various grounds—and we have resisted, even if
that has sometimes led to the blocking of our services. 71
In its arguments to the Court (and before the court of public
opinion), Google correctly contends that countries should not be
able to impose their laws on the Internet globally and should be
required to limit the extraterritorial reach of their laws so as not to
interfere with the political independence and sovereignty of other
states, and that doing otherwise would quickly lead to a race to the
bottom for Internet free speech. 72 Although each country is entidomains is nothing more than a technical path differentiation, and that all of
Google’s processing across its many domains still occurs as part of one and the
same processing system. Id. at 6.
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The Republic of Turkey, for example, in the past has repeatedly urged
Google to block access throughout the world to content that allegedly insulted the

tled to determine what speech is protected and what speech is unprotected within its territory and in particular to determine how to
balance the freedom of speech against individuals’ right to privacy
within its borders, countries do not and should not enjoy the power to implement their laws in ways that have an extraterritorial effect that spills over to restrict speech within other nations that have
adopted different regimes for protecting speech. A foundational
principle of national sovereignty is that each nation possesses full
control over the affairs within its territorial, geographic boundaries. Under generally applicable international law principles, jurisdiction is a nation’s assertion of power over the people, properties, and activities within its borders.
According to this
foundational principle of international jurisdiction:
The first and foremost restriction imposed by international
law upon a State is that—failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary—it may not exercise its power in
any form in the territory of another State. [Jurisdiction]
cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by
virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention. 73
While nations enjoy the power to determine the substantive
laws within their own territories, they generally do not enjoy the
right to dictate laws that apply outside of their territories. Thus,
any order issued by a national or regional court mandating that a
search engine delist certain websites should be given effect only
within the geographical boundaries of that country or region. As
the United States Supreme Court recently emphasized, every nation must “avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations” 74 and must ensure that the “potentially
conflicting laws of different nations work together in harmony—a
harmony particularly needed in today’s highly interdependent
memory of its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—a criminal offense in Turkey.
Although Google blocked access to such content for Internet users in Turkey,
Turkish officials apparently claimed that this country-specific blocking was insufficient to protect the rights of Turks living abroad and demanded that Google
globally block access to content that insults the memory of Ataturk. Google
properly refused to accede to this additional, overreaching request to export Turkey’s laws to the rest of the world. See, e.g., ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF
POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 284–85 (Ronald Deibert, et. al. eds., 2010).
73 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J., (ser. A.)
No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept. 7).
74 F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empargran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).

commercial world.” 75 This mandate of limiting the extraterritorial
reach of one nation’s laws reflects principles of customary international law. 76 U.S. courts have long adhered to this presumption
against extraterritorial application of our nation’s laws in order to
“protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord.” 77 U.S.
courts’ adherence to this presumption has been consistently observed, even where the laws at issue sought to regulate conduct
that was universally condemned, including crimes against humanity, 78 and courts have held fast to the “presumption that United
States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.” 79
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in circumstances presenting a mere
“risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to
regulate its own… affairs.” 80
The Republic of France has also recognized the strong presumption against the extraterritorial application of one nation’s
laws. Indeed, in a recent amicus brief to the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 81 the
French government argued that “international comity counsels
against expansive extraterritorial application” of one nation’s laws,
75
Id. at 164–65. See also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (affirming the District Court ruling that Congress
has the power to apply the National Labor Relations Act to foreign-flag vessels
while they are in American waters); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 382 (1959) (holding that the Jones Act is applicable to “foreign events,
foreign ships, and foreign seamen… in accordance with the usual doctrine and
practices of maritime law.”); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (upholding the long-held maritime principle that an Act will not apply to foreigners with
respect to acts they engage in outside the dominion of the sovereign state enacting).
76 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 403(1), 403(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 1987) (limiting the unreasonable exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction with respect to a person or activity having connections with
another State); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (identifying rule of construction as derived from the principle of “prescriptive comity”).
77 E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
78 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (holding that under the Alien Tort Statute, there is a presumption derived from a traditional canon of interpretation against extraterritorial application of U.S. law,
which serves to protect against clashes between U.S. law and the law of other nations).
79 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007).
80 F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., supra note 74, at 165. (emphasis added).
81 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).

especially where such extraterritorial application would “interfere
with the sovereign authority of foreign nations.” 82 Indeed, in its
amicus brief in that case, the French Government emphasized the
general principle of international law “by which one sovereign
power is bound to respect the subjects and the rights of all other
sovereign powers outside its own territory.” 83 The French Government explained that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations makes clear that nations should refrain from exercising their
jurisdiction to prescribe when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
“unreasonable,” and that a key determinant of whether jurisdiction
to prescribe is unreasonable is whether it would bring about “the
potential for conflict with foreign law.” 84 Where application of one
nation’s laws would “conflict with… the legal systems of other nations,” exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable and improper
within the meaning of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations. 85 Indeed, in its opinion in Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd, the United States Supreme Court cited these arguments from
the French Government’s amicus brief in support of the Court’s
holding that the United States laws at issue did not have extraterritorial application because of the “probability of incompatibility
with the applicable laws of other countries.” 86
As discussed above, courts in the United States—and throughout the world—have been particularly careful to avoid extraterritorial application of national laws when doing so would conflict with
the laws of other countries and the fundamental rights of citizens
of other countries. 87 Since the extraterritorial application beyond
the European Union of the right to be forgotten and its delisting
mandate would conflict with the laws of the United States and the
First Amendment rights of U.S. citizens—as I explain in greater detail below—the French Conseil D’État should not order Google to
implement the right to be forgotten globally.
Although the First Amendment does not mandate that every
U.S. citizen has access to information about everyone else—and,
indeed, provides much more limited protection to speech about
private figures and matters of private interest than to speech about
82 Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
83 Id. at 10.
84 Id. at 11.
85 Id.
86 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 269 (2010).
87 See text accompanying notes 74–80.

public figures and matters of public interest 88—the right to be forgotten is currently being implemented by search engines like
Google in the European Union in such a way that would be inconsistent with the First Amendment if Google were required by the
French Conseil d’État to implement the right to be forgotten globally. In initially determining how to apply the European Court of
Justice’s mandate as issued in the Google Spain case—in which the
Court had substantially deferred to Google on matters regarding
which delisting requests to grant and which to deny—Google created the Google Advisory Council composed of a number of international free speech and privacy experts who advised the company
in making its delisting decisions to take into account the data subject’s role in public life (with private figures meriting greater privacy protection than public figures) and the nature of the information
(i.e., whether the information related solely to private interests or
to the public interest). The Council advised Google that it should
be more inclined to grant delisting requests when made by private
figures and when made regarding matters that were solely of private interest and less inclined to grant delisting requests when
made by public figures and when made regarding matters of public importance. 89 To the extent that Google only granted delisting
requests when made by private figures on matters of private interest, the global implementation of the right to be forgotten would
not necessarily be inconsistent with First Amendment rights of U.S.
citizens and journalists to access and to communicate information
and ideas. As I have argued elsewhere, 90 the First Amendment’s
See text accompanying notes 90–95.
See THE ADVISORY COUNCIL TO GOOGLE ON THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN (Feb.
6,
2015)
[hereinafter
Google
Advisory
Report],
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/archive.google.com/en//advisoryc
ouncil/advisement/advisory-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8D8-9J9L].
The
Council’s proposed full list of criteria that Google should consider in implementing the Google Spain decision were: (1) the data subject’s role in public life (with
private figures meriting greater privacy protection than public figures); (2) the nature of the information (with information in the public interest—such as information relevant to political disclosure or relating to criminal activity—meriting
greater free speech protections); (3) the source of the content and the motivation to
publish it (with information provided by recognized bloggers or professional
journalistic entities meriting greater free speech protections); and (4) in cases involving criminal activity, the severity of the crime and the time that has elapsed
since the crime occurred (with the recentness and severity of crimes militating
against delisting).
90 Dawn Carla Nunziato, Forget About It? Harmonizing European and American
Protections for Privacy, Free Speech, and Due Process, in PRIVACY AND POWER: A
TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE IN THE SHADOW OF THE NSA-AFFAIR, 314 (Russell A. Miller, ed., 2016).
88
89

strongest protections extend to information on matters of legitimate public concern, as distinguished from information of purely
private concern. Thus, Google’s delisting of websites containing
information about private figures and matters of only private concern is not necessarily incompatible with the First Amendment
rights of U.S. citizens to access information on the Internet. 91 While
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the state may not constitutionally punish or restrict the “publication of truthful . . . information about a matter of public significance,” 92 it has also emphasized that the First Amendment’s strongest protections are
reserved for information on matters of public significance or concern—not on matters of private significance or concern. As the Supreme Court explained, “Speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern [than speech on matters of
public concern].” 93 In cases involving liability for or regulation of
speech on matters of private concern, the Court has ruled that
"[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues
[and] there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue
of ideas concerning self-government.” 94 The Court has emphasized that “[w]hile speech [on matters of private concern] is not totally unprotected by the First Amendment . . . its protections are
less stringent.” 95 Accordingly, if Google were required by the
French Conseil D’État to delist (and, therefore, indirectly censor
worldwide) websites relating only to matters of private importance
involving only private European figures, such a mandate would
not necessarily be inconsistent with the First Amendment.
Google, however, in its delisting decisions has been compelled
to go beyond the recommendations of the Google Advisory Council in implementing the right to be forgotten, and—as ordered by
the French Data Protection Authority CNIL—has delisted and indirectly censored websites on matters of public importance to U.S.
citizens. For example, Google has been compelled to delist websites involving United States judicial proceedings and court recSee, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (holding that speech on matters of a purely private concern has less constitutional value than speech on matters of public concern); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L. J. 967, 975
(2003) (arguing that speech of private concern is less valuable than speech of public concern).
92 Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107 (1979).
93 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., supra note 91, at 759.
94 Id. at 760.
95 Id.
91

ords indirectly censoring content that U.S. citizens have a constitutional right to access. Indeed, as the Reporters Committee on Freedom of the Press has managed to discover (notwithstanding the
lack of meaningful transparency regarding Google’s delisting decisions 96 and the absence of notice provided by Google to delisted
websites 97) the French Data Protection Authority CNIL recently
ordered Google to delist several U.S.-based websites devoted to
discussions of legal proceedings against a French citizen under the
Dodd-Frank Act (a U.S. securities law). 98 In addition, CNIL has
96 Although Google provides its Transparency Report on European Privacy
Requests for Search Removals, this report does not provide detailed, granular information about which requests for delisting Google grants and which it denies.
See
Transparency
Report,
GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en
[https://perma.cc/7A9Y-VMW9]. Rather, the Report only provides high level
data, such as the percentage of URLs removed from its search results, a list of the
most affected sites, and twenty-three examples of the types of cases in which it
has granted removal requests. The latter is of particular concern, considering that
Google has received and evaluated almost 700,000 requests for removal of approximately two million websites. Id. These twenty-three examples are general and
merely provide such information as: “After we removed a news story about a minor crime, the newspaper published a story about the removal action. The [United Kingdom] Information Commissioner’s Office ordered us to remove the second story from search results for the individual’s name. We removed the page
from search results for the individual's name.” Id. As other commentators have
noted, “Beyond anecdote, we know very little about what kind and quantity of
information is being delisted from [Google’s] search results, what sources are being delisted and on what scale, what kinds of requests fail and in what proportion, and what are Google’s guidelines in striking the balance between individual
privacy and freedom of expression interests.” See Ellen Goodman, Open Letter to
Google from 80 Internet Scholars: Release RTBF Compliance Data, MEDIUM (May 13,
2015),
https://medium.com/@ellgood/open-letter-to-google-from-80-internetscholars-release-rtbf-compliance-data-cbfc6d59f1bd#.ciqjk77th
[https://perma.cc/Z2M9-29XU].
97
As discussed infra, the European advisory body on data protection and
privacy—the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party—has determined that
search engine operators should not inform content providers about decisions to
remove access to websites before or even after the search engine operator has decided to remove access to the website. According to the Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party Guidelines, “Search engines should not as a general practice inform the webmasters of the pages affected by de-listing of the fact that some
webpages cannot be acceded from the search engine in response to specific queries . . . . No provision in EU data protection law obliges search engines to communicate to original webmasters that results relating to their content have been
de-listed. Such a communication is in many cases a processing of personal data
and, as such, requires a proper legal ground in order to be legitimate.” See Article
29 Data Prot. Working Party Guidelines, supra note 50, at 10.
98 As the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press set forth in its voluntary intervention in the CNIL v. Google case:

The CNIL has ordered the delisting of links to U.S. websites containing
court records and news coverage of court proceedings. For example, the

ordered Google to delist websites discussing a (public) Minnesota
Court of Appeals decision against a French citizen. 99 The global
implementation of the European right to be forgotten—which
would render inaccessible via Google and other search engines
websites like these involving U.S. judicial proceedings and court
decisions—would directly conflict with the First Amendment
rights of U.S. citizens and members of the press to access such matters of public importance, 100 as I discuss further below.
CNIL recently ordered the delisting of six websites originating in the
U.S.—all involving legal action against a complainant under the DoddFrank Act, a U.S. securities industry law . . . . The links, either describing
or displaying official court decisions, bear no connection to France other
than through the French nationality of the defendant. The defendant’s
employer is a New York-based company, and the allegations against him
pertain to acts he committed outside of France as chief executive officer
of that New York-based company . . . . In addition, the CNIL ordered
Google to delist a link to a public Minnesota Court of Appeals decision,
where the website’s sole association with France was the complainant’s
nationality. The decision was considered so important to the people of
Minnesota that it was made available on the Minnesota government’s
website.
See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, French Council of State Litigation Department Voluntary Submission Intervention in Support of the Petition
Submitted by Google Inc. and Against La Commission Nationale Informatique et
Libertes (CNIL) in Support of Motion No. 399.922, at 13–14
https://www.rcfp.org/sites/default/files/20161104-Google-v-CNIL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TB8-UT47].
99 Id.
100 CNIL’s efforts to compel Google to implement the European right to be
forgotten globally is reminiscent of the dispute between two convicted German
murderers and Wikipedia that involved the balance of Germany’s privacy laws
against freedom of expression. That dispute involved the attempt by Wolfgang
Werle and Manfred Lauber—who were convicted and served time for the murder
of famous German actor Walter Sedlmayr—to have their names removed from
electronic news archives and media websites that accurately reported on their
prosecution and conviction for the murder. Referencing a German court decision
that held that individuals have the right to no longer have their convictions reported, Werle and Lauber brought suit against several media outlets, including
Der Spiegel and Wikipedia, claiming that their names must be removed from the
articles on these online media websites. The Hamburg Court of First Instance
granted the relief that Werle and Lauber sought, holding that the continued online
publication of the names of the murderers violated their privacy rights and ordering the removal of their names from the subject articles. See, e.g., Wolfgang Werlé
and
Manifred
Lauber,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wolfgang_Werl%C3%A9_and_Manfred_Lauber
(last visited June 20, 2017) [https://perma.cc/B5T7-RG4H]. While the German
Wikipedia site complied with the Hamburg Court’s decision, the U.S. version of
the Wikipedia site did not, contending that it had a First Amendment right to continue to publish these individuals’ names in connection with its articles on the
murder. Wikimedia (Wikipedia’s parent company) appealed the Hamburg
Court’s decision to the German Constitutional Court. That Court reversed, ruling

U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the First Amendment’s strongest protections extend to
matters of public importance and to matters involving public figures, and especially to those matters that go to the heart of selfgovernance, including judicial proceedings. The First Amendment
provides individuals with the right to access information concerning government decision-making and, in particular, with access to
judicial records and judicial proceedings. 101 Court decisions and
court orders are generally publicly available so that individuals can
hold the government properly accountable for its judicial decisionmaking. Granting individuals access to information regarding judicial proceedings is essential for individuals to serve as effective
checks on the government. 102 Oliver Wendell Holmes, then a Justice on the Massachusetts Supreme Court, recognized in 1884 that
members of the public in a democracy must enjoy the right of access to civil trial proceedings, which is rooted in the principles of
democratic government. As Holmes explained:
It is desirable that the trial of [civil] causes should take
place under the public eye . . . because it is of the highest
moment that those who administer justice should always
act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every
citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes
as to the mode in which a public duty is performed. 103
The modern Supreme Court has recognized that members of
the public and the press have a First Amendment right of access to
judicial proceedings and has held in particular that “a presumption
of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our
in favor of Wikimedia and holding that the lower court’s decision ordering Wikipedia to remove the convicted murderers’ names from its articles would violate
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. See, e.g., Judith Bruhn, Does
A Murderer Have the Right to Be Forgotten?, FREE SPEECH DEBATE (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://freespeechdebate.com/en/case/does-a-murderer-have-the-right-to-beforgotten/ [https://perma.cc/LK42-9X5P] (questioning whether an individual’s
right to be forgotten should take priority over the public’s right to know about the
individual's past, specifically involvement in past crimes).
101 In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1984) (establishing a
First Amendment right of access to records submitted in connection with criminal
proceedings); Oregon Publ'g Co. v. U.S. District Court, 920 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir.
1990) (extending qualified right of access to plea agreements and related documents in criminal cases).
102 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989); In
re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d at 52; United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348,
1359–60 (3d Cir. 1994).
103 Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).

system of justice.” 104 The Court has explained that our several First
Amendment freedoms—the freedom of speech and of the press,
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances—“share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating
to the functioning of government,” and that this purpose is advanced by public and press access to court proceedings. All court
proceedings, both criminal 105 and civil, 106 are presumed to be open
and accessible to the public. 107 This right of access is not limited to
attending court proceedings but also extends to access to court
documents. As the Supreme Court has explained, the First
Amendment provides a right of access to court documents to promote “the free discussion of governmental affairs,” 108 so as to “ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and
contribute to our republican system of self-government.” 109 Restrictions on public access to information such as court records,
court documents, and other government records, as well as restrictions on the ability of the press to publish information regarding such information, are therefore presumptively incompatible
with the First Amendment.
Although, as discussed above, the right to be forgotten is not
necessarily incompatible with the freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment, this right has been implemented by Google—at the
request of French data subjects and French Data Protection AuthorRichmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980).
All stages of criminal proceedings are presumed to be accessible to the
public. The public’s access will only be restricted if the court finds that the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial is threatened. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984); Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1,
11 (1986).
106 All civil court proceedings are presumed to be open and accessible to the
public. A court will only restrict the public’s access to civil court proceedings if it
finds that doing so serves an overriding public interest, that the public interest
will be prejudiced in the absence of closure, that the closure is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest, and that there is no less restrictive means to serve that overriding public interest. Further, the court must give the public notice before it issues an order restricting the public’s access to a civil court proceeding. See NBC
Subsidiary, Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 4th 1178 (1999) (vacating lower court
decision to restrict media outlets because there were no identified proceedings
that would or did contain information justifying closure, and there were less restrictive means of achieving a fair trial).
107 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 44 U.S. 555 (1980); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
108 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. at 604 (citing Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1996)).
109 Id.
104
105

ity CNIL—in ways that are incompatible with First Amendment
freedoms by delisting websites involving U.S. judicial proceedings
and court decisions. If the French Conseil d’État were to uphold
CNIL’s decision requiring Google to globally remove links to websites that host items like these on all of Google’s domains including
Google.com, such a decision would directly conflict with the rights
of United States citizens and members of the press under the First
Amendment to access this information. This is especially problematic given the extent to which French citizens avail themselves of
requests to delist websites from search engines like Google. Although French citizens make up only 13% of the population of the
European Union, requests from French citizens account for onethird of the requests to delist that Google has received to date and
Google has granted 49% of the delisting requests that it has received from French citizens. 110 If French citizens persist in demanding that Google delist websites, and if Google were required
to implement such delisting globally across all of its domains,
French (and other European) citizens would be able to exercise unprecedented and unwarranted influence over the ability of other
citizens—including United States citizens—to access information
on the Internet that they have a constitutional right to access.
The recent U.S. Second Circuit case of Martin v. Hearst 111 underscores the pre-eminent First Amendment value of ensuring public
access to information about criminal proceedings and protecting
the right of the press—including the online press—to publish information about such proceedings, even under circumstances in
which aspects of the proceedings had been “forgotten” or erased
subject to a state expungement law. Martin v. Hearst involved an
arrestee’s attempt to implement a version of the right to be forgotten in the United States, premised upon Connecticut’s Erasure
Statute, 112 which requires that criminal records related to an arrest
be destroyed if the individual is subsequently found not guilty or
pardoned or if the charges are dropped or “nolled” (i.e., subject to a
nolle prosequi decision by the prosecutor or dismissed) and after
which an arrestee is “deemed to have never been arrested within
In its latest Transparency Report, Google indicates that it has received
221,561 requests for delisting from French citizens, out of a total of 685,240 requests from citizens throughout the European Union. See Transparency Report,
European
Privacy
Requests
for
Search
Removals,
Google,
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en
(last updated June 19, 2017) [https://perma.cc/P5P7-DUD2].
111 777 F. 3d 546 (2d Cir. 2015).
112 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54–142a(e)(3) (2017).
110

the meaning of the general statutes with respect to the proceedings
so erased[.]”). 113 In this case, Lorraine Martin and her two sons
were arrested after police found drugs and drug paraphernalia
upon a search of her home. A few weeks after her arrest, several
local newspapers published truthful and accurate articles reporting
upon her arrest. The state ultimately decided not to pursue its case
against Martin and a nolle prosequi decision was entered, which entitled Martin to have her arrest records erased pursuant to the state
Erasure Statute. After her arrest records were erased pursuant to
the statute, Martin requested that the newspapers remove the accounts of her arrest from their news websites arguing that the statute requires the newspapers to give full effect to the statute’s mandate that she is "deemed to have never been arrested . . . with
respect to the proceedings so erased[.]” 114 When the newspapers
refused to remove the accounts of her arrest from their websites,
Martin sued them for defamation, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and related invasion of privacy claims. 115
In rejecting Martin’s defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and related invasion of privacy claims, the Second
Circuit explained that the truth of the articles provided an unassailable defense for the newspapers’ accurate reporting on Martin’s
arrest and that the newspapers had a First Amendment right to
publish the accounts in the first place—as well as to maintain the
online news archives of such accounts. Construing the state Erasure Statute, the Second Circuit explained:
The statute creates legal fictions, but it does not and cannot
undo historical facts or convert once-true facts into falsehoods. Neither the Erasure Statute nor any amount of wishing can undo that historical truth . . . Because there is no
dispute that the articles published by the Defendants accurately report Martin's arrest, her various publication-related
tort claims necessarily fail. Martin's claims for libel and
placing another in a false light fail because the articles do
not contain falsehoods. Her claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress fails because there is nothing negligent
about publishing a true and newsworthy article. 116
The court explained that to hold the newspaper liable for any
113
114
115
116

Id.
Id.
Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F. 3d 546, 551 (2nd Cir. 2015).
Id. at 551–552.

of these defamation or privacy torts would violate the newspaper’s
rights under the First Amendment. It explained that if a news organization “lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance, then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a
state interest of the highest order.” 117 The court concluded that,
despite Martin’s privacy and reputational interests in securing the
erasure of her arrest records from the state’s records, the newspaper nonetheless still enjoyed the right to publish truthful and accurate news articles on such matters and members of the public enjoy
a concomitant right to access such content on the Internet.
In sum, the global implementation of the right to be forgotten—
as the French Data Protection Authority is now demanding before
France’s highest administrative court—coupled with the mandate
that Google indirectly censor websites on matters of public importance to U.S. citizens (including on matters relating to U.S. judicial proceedings and court records) is not only an unwarranted extraterritorial extension of European jurisprudence to prescribe, but
would also result in a direct conflict with the First Amendment
rights of U.S. citizens and members of the press.
5. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S NEW PRIVACY LAW—THE GENERAL
DATA PROTECTION REGULATION—WILL ONLY INCREASE THE
PROBLEMS WITH THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
The various issues and problems analyzed above in connection
with the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive and its interpretation
by the European Court of Justice and European courts to support
the right to be forgotten will only be exacerbated when the Directive is superseded by the General Data Protection Regulation.
In May 2018, the EU Data Protection Directive, under which the
original right to be forgotten decision was recognized, was replaced by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a massive overhaul of European data privacy regulation. 118 This Regula117
Id. See also Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004)
(explaining that news publishers cannot be held liable for invasion of privacy for
reporting on plaintiff’s criminal record and criminal activities that occurred more
than a dozen years prior).
118 This Regulation, which was adopted in April 2016, entered into application on May 25, 2018, after a transition period of two years. In contrast to the 1995
EU Data Protection Directive, the GDPR—because it is a Regulation rather than a
Directive—does not require the European national governments to pass any ena-

tion, adopted in April 2016, entered into application on May 25,
2018, after a two-year transition period. Unlike the 1995 EU Data
Protection Directive, the Regulation does not require national governments to pass any enabling legislation to enforce its terms since,
as a Regulation, it is self-executing. The General Data Protection
Regulation, which updates and overhauls the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive, expressly provides that it extends to all foreign
companies that process the data of EU residents, regardless of
where those companies are located. Unlike the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive, the Regulation expressly applies to organizations
based outside the European Union if they process the personal data of EU residents. The Regulation harmonizes the data protection
regulations throughout the EU and imposes a strict compliance regime on all foreign companies that control or process EU residents’
data. Importantly, the Regulation imposes substantial fines—EUR
20 million or 4% of a company’s total worldwide annual turnover
of the preceding year, whichever is higher—on data controllers
(like Google) who fail to comply with the Regulation’s strict terms
for the protection of data. 119
Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation—entitled
“Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)”—specifically grants European data subjects the right to require that data controllers erase
and cease from redistributing personal information about the data
subject without undue delay, if the data are no longer necessary in
relation to the purposes for which they were collected or processed, if the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing was based, or where there is no legal ground for the processing. This Article further requires data controllers to inform
downstream data processors of the data subject’s request for erasure. The applicable provisions from the Regulation and their complex interactions are as follows:
Article 17 Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)
bling legislation to enforce its terms and will go into effect automatically upon its
effective date. See Daphne Keller, Intermediary Liability and User Content Under Europe’s New Data Protection Law, STAN. L. SCH.: THE CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/intermediaryliability-and-user-content-under-europe%E2%80%99s-new-data-protection-law
[https://perma.cc/G5X6-UY2N].
119 See General Data Protection Regulation [hereinafter GDPR] 2016/679, art.
83, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2016:119:FULL&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/6ATJ-5RM9] (detailing the fines to be imposed on data controllers who fail to comply with the Regulation’s strict terms).

1. The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the
controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or
her without undue delay and the controller shall have the
obligation to erase personal data without undue delay
where one of the following grounds applies:
(a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to
the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise
processed;
(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), 120 or
point (a) of Article 9(2) 121 and where there is no other legal
ground for the processing;
(c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) 122 and there are no overriding legitimate grounds
120 Id. Article 6(1)(a) provides that processing of personal data shall be lawful
only if and to the extent that "the data subject has given consent to the processing
of their personal data for one or more specific purposes."
121 Id. Article 9(2)(a) provides that the prohibition set forth in Article 9(1) on
the processing of special categories of personal data—defined as data revealing
“racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or
trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for
the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or
data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation”—shall not apply
“if the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal
data for one or more specified purposes, except where Union or Member State law
provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the
data subject.”
122 Id. Article 21, the Right to Object, provides in Section 1:

The data subject shall have the right to object, on grounds relating to
his or her particular situation, at any time to processing of personal
data concerning him or her which is based on point (e) or (f) of Article 6(1), including profiling based on those provisions. The controller shall no longer process the personal data unless the controller
demonstrates compelling legitimate grounds for the processing
which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject
or for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims.
Article 6, Lawfulness of Processing, provides in its Section(1)(e) and (f) that processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that:
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in
the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the
controller;
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests
pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests
are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of
the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular
where the data subject is a child.

for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2) 123;
(d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed;
(e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with
a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which
the controller is subject;
(f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the
offer of information society services referred to in Article
8(1). 124
2. Where the controller has made the personal data public
and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable
steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers
which are processing the personal data that the data subject
has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links
to, or copy or replication of, those personal data.
3. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the extent that processing is necessary:
(a) for exercising the right of freedom of expression and information;
(b) for compliance with a legal obligation which requires
processing by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject or for the performance of a task carried out
in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority
vested in the controller;
(c) for reasons of public interest in the area of public health

123

Id. Article 21, the Right to Object, provides in Section 2:

Where personal data are processed for direct marketing purposes, the
data subject shall have the right to object at any time to processing of
personal data concerning him or her for such marketing, which includes
profiling to the extent that it is related to such direct marketing.
124
Id. Article 8(1) provides: “Where point (a) of Article 6(1) applies [(i.e.,
where the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal
data for one or more specific purposes)] in relation to the offer of information society services directly to a child, the processing of the personal data of a child shall
be lawful where the child is at least 16 years old. Where the child is below the age
of 16 years, such processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that consent is
given or authorized by the holder of parental responsibility over the child.”

in accordance with points (h) and (i) of Article 9(2) 125 as
well as Article 9(3) 126;
(d) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or
historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) 127 in so far as the right referred
to in paragraph 1 is likely to render impossible or seriously
impair the achievement of the objectives of that processing;
or
(e) for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims.
125 Id. Article 9(2)(h) and (i) allow for the processing of special categories of
personal data—defined as data revealing “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a
natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex
life or sexual orientation”—when “(h) processing is necessary for the purposes of
preventive or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the working capacity
of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems and services on the basis
of Union or Member State law or pursuant to contract with a health professional
and subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 3; (i) processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, such
as protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high
standards of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal products or medical devices, on the basis of Union or Member State law which provides for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject,
in particular professional secrecy.”
126 Id. Article 9(3) allows for the processing of special categories of personal
data—data revealing “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data,
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation”—“when those data are processed by or under the responsibility of a professional subject to the obligation of professional secrecy under Union or Member
State law or rules established by national competent bodies or by another person
also subject to an obligation of secrecy under Union or Member State law or rules
established by national competent bodies.”
127 Id. Article 89, entitled, “Safeguards and derogations relating to processing
for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes,” provides in Section 1:

Processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes, shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, in accordance with this Regulation, for the rights
and freedoms of the data subject. Those safeguards shall ensure that
technical and organizational measures are in place in particular in order
to ensure respect for the principle of data minimization. Those measures
may include pseudonymisation provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where those purposes can be fulfilled by further
processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification
of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner.

Although the above language from the Regulation nominally
provides the data controller with a “freedom of expression” defense to the data subject’s erasure request, other aspects of the
Regulation—including the exorbitant fines for noncompliance and
the “necessity” caveat on the freedom of expression defense—will
likely skew the balance in favor of the data subject’s removal rights
and against the data controller’s right to freedom of expression.
Other procedural aspects of the Regulation’s contemplated review
and removal process will also tilt the balance in favor of erasure
and against freedom of expression. As data protection expert
Daphne Keller explains, the Regulation’s terms—including the requirement that the data controller take down personal data immediately (while evaluating the merits of the data subject’s claim) and
the burden of proof placed on the data controller, coupled with the
exorbitant financial penalties for noncompliance—will create an
unprecedented imbalance in the Internet ecosystem in favor of data
subjects’ erasure requests and against the right to access and right
to publish information on the Internet, 128 as I examine below.
First, Article 12 of the Regulation—in its provision of guidelines for data controllers like Google for facilitating the exercise of
data subjects’ rights under Article 17’s right to erasure/right to be
forgotten—provides that controllers shall act “without undue delay,” which in general means “within one month of receipt of the
[data subject’s] request.” 129 Article 12 further provides that the data controller may refuse to take action on the data subject’s right to
be forgotten/right to erasure requests only if the requests from the
data subject are “manifestly unfounded or excessive.” 130 The burden of proving that the data subject’s requests are “manifestly unfounded or excessive,” however, falls on the data controller. If the
data controller is disinclined to grant the data subject’s removal request—because the controller believes the request to be manifestly
unfounded or excessive, for example—the data subject nonetheless
has the right to secure the temporary takedown of his or her personal data from all public websites under Article 18 of the Regulation. That is, the default under the Regulation is that the data subSee Daphne Keller, The Final Draft of Europe’s “Right to Be Forgotten”
Law, Stan. L. Sch.: The Ctr. for Internet and Soc’y (Dec. 17, 2015)
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/12/final-draft-europes-right-beforgotten-law [https://perma.cc/FM2G-T7BE] (explaining that the Regulation’s
terms will create an unprecedented balance on the Internet in favor of data subjects’ erasure requests).
129 See GDPR, supra note 119, at art. 12(3).
130 Id.
128

ject has the right to have the websites containing his or her personal data taken down during the pendency of the data controller’s
consideration of the data subject’s request. As Daphne Keller explains in interpreting the interplay of these Articles, search engines
like Google “must take the challenged content offline immediately,
before weighing the public interest [in keeping the website up] and
perhaps before even looking at the content.” 131 In other words, a
search engine or other data controller is required to restrict the
processing of data pending its verification of whether the legitimate
grounds of the data controller override those of the data subject. 132
Importantly, one essential element that is conspicuously absent
from the Regulation is the provision of notice and an opportunity
to be heard for the website publisher or speaker whose speech is
being erased or delisted. The Regulation’s contemplated regime
for data controllers’ evaluation of erasure/right to be forgotten requests does nothing to remedy the procedural defects in the decision-making process contemplated by the European Court of Justice’s right to be forgotten regime under the 1995 EU Data
Protection Directive, under which no notice or opportunity to be
heard is to be granted to the affected speakers or publishers, either
before or after a decision has been made to delist their websites. 133
As I have argued elsewhere, to the extent that the right to erasure/right to be forgotten is implemented in a manner that fails to
accord notice or an opportunity to be heard to speakers or publishers whose content is to be indirectly censored by a search engine,
such a process is radically deficient from the perspective of fundamental shared notions of due process principles. 134 Fundamental
Id.
See Keller, supra note 128.
133 Under the decision-making regime contemplated under the original right
to be forgotten decision, search engines like Google are prohibited from providing
notice or an opportunity to be heard to websites whose content a data subject requests to be delisted. The EU Article 29 Working Party has also concluded that
search engines should not provide notice to websites whose content is delisted
and that there is no legal basis for providing such notice. In its Guidelines, the
Working Party indicates:
131
132

Communication to website editors on the de-listing of specific links.
Search engines should not as a general practice inform the webmasters of
the pages affected by de-listing of the fact that some web pages cannot be
acceded from the search engine in response to a specific name-based
query. There is no legal basis for such routine communication under EU
data protection law.
See Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party Guidelines, supra note 50, at 9.
134 See Nunziato, supra note 90, at 304 (explaining that the process through
which Google has implemented the Court’s decision fails to provide the proce-

shared notions of due process of law require that an individual be
granted notice and the opportunity to be heard and to state her
case to an impartial decision-maker before she is deprived of her
fundamental rights—including her right to freedom of expression.
The U.S. Constitution’s Due Process provisions, for example, require that any such deprivation of individuals’ right to freedom of
expression occur only as a result of a fair, independent, and impartial decision-making process in which affected parties are provided
with meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard before a
decision is rendered. 135 Before the state deprives an individual of a
substantial liberty interest such as the right to freedom of expression, the individual must be accorded: adequate notice of the basis
for government action; an opportunity to be heard by the decisionmaker; and a determination by an impartial decision-maker. Importantly, when the state seeks to authorize a restriction on an individual’s freedom of expression, prior notice to that individual
must be provided (“An elementary and fundamental requirement
of due process in any proceeding . . . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the .
. . action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”). 136 Absent such procedural safeguards, state-authorized
restrictions on expression are unconstitutional. These fundamental
due process principles are recognized in the governing documents
of the European Union as well. With respect to the determination
of civil rights and obligations, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides for the general right to procedural
fairness, including a hearing before a fair, independent, and impartial tribunal that provides a reasoned judgment. 137 In each of these
foundational documents and instruments, procedural due process
rights and the right to independent, impartial, and fair judicial determinations of one’s civil and human rights are recognized as necessary for the meaningful protection of substantive rights—
including the right to freedom of expression—in the European Union. The European Court of Human Rights has emphasized the
dural safeguards necessary for the protection of speech under fundamental notions of due process shared by both the US and the European legal systems).
135 1 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise On Constitutional Law:
Substance And Procedure § 17.4(c) (5th ed. 2012).
136 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
137 European Convention, supra note 39, at art. 6(1) (“In the determination of
his civil rights and obligations . . . everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by
law.”).

centrality of the rights of procedural due process articulated in Article 6 of the European Convention and has affirmed that an expansive view of these procedural rights is fundamental to protecting
civil and human rights. 138
Because the General Data Protection Regulation charges the
search engine/data controller with making the decision whether to
grant the data subject’s request to delist or erase the website(s) at
issue without hearing from one side (i.e., the publisher or speaker
of the content), this process is severely deficient from the perspective of fundamental principles of due process shared by both the
United States and the European Union and will undoubtedly lead
to a lopsided consideration of the merits of the privacy versus free
speech interests at stake. This factor—coupled with the exorbitant
fines that can be levied against data controllers for failure to comply with the Regulation’s strict erasure mandates—will likely produce an Internet ecosystem that fails to adequately balance free
speech interests against competing privacy interests.
In short, rather than remedying the imbalance between privacy
and free speech interests and the due process concerns that have
developed as a result of the implementation of the Google Spain’s
right to be forgotten decision under the 1995 European Union Data
Protection Directive, the General Data Protection Regulation exacerbates such problems and skews the playing field and the Internet
ecosystem even further in favor of censorship in the name of privacy and against freedom of expression on the Internet.
6. THE EXPANSION OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN BEYOND THE
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The expansion of the scope and geographical reach of the right
to be forgotten from the limited scope and reach of the decision as
originally recognized by the European Court of Justice in 2014 is
problematic in a variety of ways, as I have analyzed above. Yet,
the difficulties that the right to be forgotten poses for the right to
freedom of expression online will only multiply as other countries
adopt versions of that right and as they attempt (as France has
done) to implement their version of the right beyond their borders.
The right to be forgotten is no longer confined to the member states
of the European Union, and, in the three years since it was recog138
See Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 355 (1970) (cited in RICHARD
CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, THE LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 621-22 (2009)).

nized by the European Court of Justice, has expanded to other
countries in Europe as well as to countries in Asia and the Americas, including Mexico, Japan, Russia, Colombia, and India.
Mexico. In 2014, Mexico adopted a framework similar to that
adopted by the European Court of Justice in its Google Spain decision in a case decided by Mexico’s National Institute for the Access
to Information (INAI) under its Federal Personal Data Protection
Processed by Private Entities Act. 139 Under this Act, every person
has the right to request the cancellation of his or her personal data
and the right to oppose its processing. 140 Article 25 of the Act
grants data subjects the right to request that a data controller stop
processing and that the data controller (partially or completely)
erase his or her personal data. Once a data subject makes a request
to the data controller to cancel the processing of his or her personal
data, the data controller must stop processing such personal data
immediately, subject to certain limited exceptions. 141 In addition,
Article 27 of the Act grants data subjects the right to prevent a data
controller from continuing to process the data subject’s personal
data for any legitimate reason. In a recent landmark case, Carlos
Sanchez de la Pena, a Mexican businessman and data subject who
objected to negative but truthful comments about his business
139 See Sánchez de la Peña v. Google México, S. de R.L., PPD.0094/14 (Mex.).
See also, Background: The Right to Be Forgotten in National and Regional Contexts, International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions,
http://www.ifla.org/files/assets/clm/statements/rtbf_background.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GU3L-EK4H]; Laurence Iliff, Google Wages Free-Speech Fight in
Mexico, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/google-wagesfree-speech-fight-in-mexico-1432723483 [https://perma.cc/9C4M-NN47] (discussing the decision).
140 See Reglamento de la Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en
Posesión de los Particulares (Regulations of the Federal Law on the Protection of
Personal Data in Held by Private Parties) [RLFPDPPP], Art. 22, 28, Diario Oficial
de la Federación [DOF] 21-12-2011 (Mex.).
141 Reglamento de la Ley Federal de Protección de Datos Personales en Posesión de los Particulares (Regulations of the Federal Law on the Protection of Personal Data in Held by Private Parties) [RLFPDPPP], Art. 26, Diario Oficial de la
Federación [DOF] 05-07-2010 (Mex.) (providing that the data controller is not required to cancel the personal data if:

The personal data is necessary to fulfill a contract, agreement or providing of services between the controller and the data subject; the processing
is required by law; the cancellation or erasure could undermine a criminal or administrative investigation or could prevent the imposition of
criminal or administrative sanctions; the personal data is necessary to
protect a data subject’s legal interest or to fulfill a legal obligation or
agreement; or the personal data used for health and medical care, when
the data is processed by a doctor or health care professional.).

dealings on various websites (including discussions of the government’s bailout of his business for various bad loans), argued
that Google should be required to delist these articles, notwithstanding the fact that they were truthful and that they arguably involved matters of public concern. The National Institute for the
Access to Information agreed with de la Pena and ordered Google
to remove the search results upon a search of de la Pena’s name on
Google’s Mexican search domain. 142 This decision suggests that
Mexico’s newly-enshrined right to be forgotten will be implemented in a manner that fails to account for the right to access speech on
matters of public importance and public concern.
Japan. Only a few months after the European Court of Justice’s
Google Spain decision, a Japanese court issued the country’s first
right to be forgotten decision. In October 2014, the Tokyo District
Court issued an injunction ordering Google to delist websites relating to the past criminal activity of a Japanese man. Since then, Yahoo! Japan has implemented a procedure through which Japanese
individuals can request that Yahoo! Japan delist websites that contain information that they believe interferes with their right to privacy. 143 Yahoo! Japan will delist websites that contain information
about individuals’ sensitive information that individuals seek to
have removed, including their past criminal offenses.
Russia. The Russian Federation recently enacted its right to be
forgotten law, which came into effect on January 1, 2016. In enacting the law, Russian lawmakers referred explicitly to the European
Court of Justice’s Google Spain decision and borrowed from that
decision’s reasoning and from the underlying European Union’s
Data Protection Directive. 144 The law grants Russian data subjects
the right to request delisting from any search engine that makes
available advertising directed at individuals residing in the RusId.
Yahoo Japan Sets Out Procedure for Search Result Removal, THE JAPAN TIMES
(Mar.
31,
2015),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/31/national/yahoo-japan-setsprocedure-search-result-removal/#.Vk3wHXbnuU
[https://perma.cc/ZDU5Z2Y5]. See also Juston McCurry, Japan Recognizes ‘Right to Be Forgotten' of Man
Convicted of Child Sex Offences, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/01/japan-recognisesright-to-be-forgotten-of-man-convicted-of-child-sex-offences
[https://perma.cc/4DGK-BVDZ].
144
See RUSSIA: THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN” BILL, ARTICLE 19.ORG (Aug.
2015), https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38099/Full-Analysis--Russia---RTBF-Final-EHH.pdf [https://perma.cc/W55J-97NC] (analyzing the
Russian “Right to be Forgotten” Bill and its compatibility with international
standards of freedom of expression).
142
143

sian Federation. As under the European Union’s Data Protection
Directive, under the Russian right to be forgotten law, data subjects
are granted the right to request the delisting of websites containing
information about them where the information is inaccurate, out of
date, or irrelevant. 145 In addition, the Russian right to be forgotten
law grants data subjects a general purpose right to request the
delisting of any information about them that is disseminated “contrary to Russian law,” including, for example, “instructions on
manufacturing of drugs, information about committing suicide, information on gambling, [and] pornography.” 146 Specifically, the
Russian right to be forgotten law provides that search engines operators must “stop providing links to websites . . . [that are] distributed in violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation,
[are] inaccurate and dated, [or] which [have] lost meaning for the
application by virtue of any subsequent events or actions taken by
the applicant.” 147 Notably, the Russian right to be forgotten law
does not provide for any exceptions to that right for matters of
public interest or for public figures, 148 and, as such, will likely have
harmful consequences for the free flow of information in Russia.
Colombia. Colombia’s Constitutional Court has adopted a particularly problematic interpretation of the right to be forgotten, one
that applies directly against the underlying websites at issue instead of merely against search engines like Google including in the
context of websites’ truthful and accurate reporting about a criminal prosecution. In a decision reached in 2015, the Colombian
Constitutional Court granted an individual’s request to de-list information about her criminal prosecution against the original news
website itself and required the newspaper El Tiempo to use technical measures (such as the robots.txt file) to ensure that the web
pages at issue in its news archives—which truthfully described the
individual’s prosecution for slave trafficking—could not be indexed by search engines. 149
Id.
See, e.g., Ruslan Nurullaev, Right to Be Forgotten in the European Union and
Russia: Comparison and Criticism, 3 L. J. OF THE HIGHER SCH. OF ECON., 181, 190
(2015),
available
at
https://www.hse.ru/data/2015/10/11/1076267685/nurullaev.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GU6Q-BDMB].
147 Id.
148 See, e.g., Access Now Position Paper: Understanding the Right to Be Forgotten
9
(Sept.
2016),
Globally,
ACCESSNOW.ORG.,
https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/09/Access-Not-paperthe-Right-to-be-forgotten.pdf [https://perma.cc/44XQ-F8GQ].
149 See Colombia: Constitutional Court Rules on the “Right to Be Forgotten,” INT’L
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India. In early 2017, an Indian court of appeals, the Karnataka
High Court of India, was the first in the nation to judicially recognize an Indian data subject’s right to be forgotten. 150 The court’s
landmark ruling recognizing the right to be forgotten is particularly problematic because it mandated the anonymization of information involving court records that were in the public domain.
The case involved the interests of a woman who had previously
been married, but who later sought a judicial annulment of that
marriage. The father of the woman petitioned the court to remove
her name from the court records involving the annulment, claiming on behalf of his daughter that the public accessibility of the
court records involving the annulment of her marriage would affect her relationship with her current husband and her reputation
in society. The Karnataka High Court granted the father’s request
to anonymize his daughter’s name in the court records involving
the previous request for annulment, holding that the recognition of
the right to be forgotten in this instance was “in line with the trend
in western countries of the ‘right to be forgotten’ in sensitive cases
involving women in general and highly sensitive cases involving
rape or affecting the modesty and reputation of the person concerned.” 151 This case creates precedent for the removal of information from the public domain and from electronic court records
and therefore is a particularly problematic application of the right
to be forgotten.
With the recent adoption of versions of the right to be forgotten
in several other countries in Europe as well as in Asia and the
Americas, one-third of the world’s population now lives under a
regime in which search engines—and in some cases news, media,
and government websites themselves—are under an obligation, directly or indirectly, to censor content that is claimed to violate the
privacy rights (or, as in India’s case, the modesty and reputational
interests) of a complaining data subject. The expansion of the geographical scope and reach of the right to be forgotten will pose increasing dangers to the Internet ecosystem and the free flow of inACAD.
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http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2015/t-277-15.htm (summarizing the Constitutional Court of Colombia’s decision on the right to be forgotten).
150 Sri Vasunathan v. The Registrar General, W.P. No. 62038/2016 (Kar. Jan.
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151 Id. at 4.

formation on the Internet.
7. CONCLUSION
When the European Court of Justice initially enshrined the
right to be forgotten in May 2014, it created a limited right and imposed a limited remedy—one that applied only to search engines,
that only mandated delisting of certain search results by search engines (not erasure or anonymization by the offending websites
themselves), and that only applied to search engines’ European
domains. As the right to be forgotten enters its fourth year of enactment, the right has been expanded in a myriad of ways that
pose grave concerns for freedom of expression on the Internet: it
has been applied to require news, government, and other websites
to erase and anonymize content regarding matters of public importance; it has been recognized in at least six new countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas; and, if the French Data Protection
Authority has its way, it will be implemented globally, to all
searches on Google.com, for example, to censor the content accessible by Internet users across the globe, regardless of whether they
live in a country that recognizes the right to be forgotten. To make
matters worse, the data protection regulation that went into effect
in May 2018 grants even greater rights to data subjects to secure
the removal of Internet content with which they disagree, without
according fundamental due process protections—notice and an
opportunity to be heard—to those whose speech is to be censored.
Absent greater attention to these issues, and absent the contraction
of this rapidly expanding right to be forgotten, free speech on the
Internet as we know it will continue to be imperiled.

